participants that the massive prayer was a message "to other European nations so that they understand that it's necessary to return to Christian roots so that Europe may remain Europe." 5 The event was also advertised on TV and endorsed on Twitter by a number of prominent politicians of the governing Law and Justice party, including the Prime Minister. While the official event website and the website of the Polish Bishops' Conference emphasized the redemptive dimension of this massive Rosary prayer, the fact that it was organized on the feast established to commemorate the Battle of Lepanto, when the Catholic 4 In 2013 Archbishop Jędraszewski notably framed the matter of European identity in racial terms.
Criticizing "gender ideology" and blaming it for contributing to the demographic crisis, he said: "I can easily imagine than at some point in the future … the few white people will be shown to other human races, here, in Europe, just as the Indians are being shown in the US reservations. There lived such people here once, but became extinct on their own wish, because they weren't prepared to accept their biological selves" ("Metropolita łódzki: Przez gender biali mogą być jak Indianie w rezerwatach," Gazeta Wyborcza polities. 16 Their ubiquity is most likely related to the fact that they "reveal values at their deepest level . . . men express in ritual what moves them most, and since the form of expression is conventionalized and obligatory, it is the values of the group that are revealed." 17 What values are revealed in the "Rosary to the Borders"? The ritual reveals and reinforces people's religiosity and intense patriotism and asserts symbolically that in proposing a vision of "the Polish people" -a quintessentially political act -it is hard to ignore Catholicism as the dominant cultural system of reference. 18 It also shows that Polish Catholicism, certainly its folk dimension, 19 is saturated with ritualism, visualism, and magical thinking. . 18 There is a long-standing debate on the link between Catholicism and Polish national identitygiven that over 90% of Poles regard themselves as Catholics (see "Przynależność Polaków do ruchów i wspólnot religijnych, Komunikat z badań 84/2017, CBOS, Warszawa, June 2017). We do not doubt that at different levels and in various situations, this link manifests itself in different forms and sometimes may be absent. We want to point out merely that in the 2010s, at the level of "national" discourse this link was intensely promoted, often in elaborate symbolic forms. See also K. For the participants of Rosary to the Borders, putting on a massive religious ritual seems to have been an efficacious magico-religious method 21 of dealing with what they perceived as a pressing problem. At the same time, they marked the symbolic boundaries of their "imagined community" and symbolically reinforced their state's political borders (Fig. 2) . 22 Thus, despite its pronounced universalistic intention to bring peace not just to Poland but the whole world, the ritual could be interpreted as an inward looking act of building a "fortress" against real or imagined external enemies. 23 As such, the ritual was not only a religious act of addressing a deity, but it suggested -rather forcefully -a polarized and religiously inflected division of the world into "us" and "them." Indeed, similar interpretations have emerged and dominated several, 19 Folk Catholicism, which was the dominant form of religiosity until 1970s, and has since been diffused due to the processes of urbanization and internal migration, to a great extent still shapes some vital traits of common religiosity in Poland. It can be characterized by features such as: collectivism and the importance of the local parish; ritualism and a high degree of observance of collective ceremonies; poor theological consciousness; emotional dimension and familial attachment to the divine persons, saints, and in particular to the Holy Mother; and a belief in miracles and supernatural interventions that engenders admiration of certain miraculous paintings and apparitions, which fuel the powerful pilgrimage culture. See K. Kaczmarek "Polish Religiousness: Mainstream and Peripheries," Religious Studies and Theology 27, no. 1 (2008): 43-68. 20 "Magic fails to acknowledge the distinction between physical and psychological causes, the difference between 'energetic and informational processes.' As Zusne and Jones state it, 'When meaning, instead of the physical processes of energy transfer or information transmission, is taken to be causal, when meaning is externalized or reified, magical thinking enters into this picture.'" (R. 23 An influential bishop emeritus, Tadeusz Pieronek, said in an interview for Famiglia Cristiana "it is clear that all the Poles who participated in the Rosary are against the thinking and teaching of Pope Francis. Unfortunately. In Poland there is an ongoing battle to persuade people that every refugee is a bandit threatening Polish identity and is a serious and real menace to the health and life of Poles." (Bp T. Pieronek, "La Chiesa Polacca su una strada pericolosa, sostiene il governo e dimentica il Papa," interview, Famiglia Cristiana, 11 October 2017, http://www.famigliacristiana.it/articolo/la-chiesa-polacca-su-unastrada-pericolosa-parla-mons-pieronek.aspx (accessed 17 October 2017)).
particularly foreign, accounts of this event.
24 "The people" were constituted relatively narrowly, within the confines of a specifically interpreted ethno-religious idiom. The new religious-political boundary was designed also to protect one's own "cultural substance" against the undesired pollution coming from the outside world, suggesting that we deal here not only with the sacralization of politics, but also with the politicization of religion.
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Polarizing imagery of Solidarity
The most powerful rebellion against the communist rule the Soviet Bloc ever experienced, the Solidarity movement, was to a large degree a massive performance of Catholic patriotism imbued with Romantic imagery. The symbolic "tone" of the movement was set during the strikes of August 1980, particularly in Gdańsk. The strike's décor and worker's religious rituals were permeated by Catholic motifs (Fig. 3) . The grand themes of Polish Romanticism (for example, the belief in the causal power of words or the sense of extraordinary national mission) were often invoked in the performances of professional artists who joined the workers and in the workers' own poetry.
The Solidarity culture forged in the Gdańsk Shipyard is sometimes interpreted as complex and multi-vocal. 27 But its basic political imagery was profoundly binary. It projected a picture of the world in which the "good," religious people were sharply juxtaposed to the "bad," secular authorities. It was not a new feature in Polish people's efforts at self-definition, for as Borowik observes: "Before the democratic changes initiated in Poland in 1989, the Church was a key element in the dualistic structure of society -divided into 'bad' communists, belonging to the communist party and its apparatus, and 'good' Polish patriots, belonging to the Roman Catholic
Church." 28 However, prior to 1980, this dualism had never had such a powerful and lavish symbolic elaboration. Between August 1980 and December 1981, this dominant symbolic polarization was reiterated in many performances (including rallies and strikes) and later intensified in the countless "illegal" demonstrations against the communist rulers of the Martial Law regime and its aftermath (1981-89).
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How can this polarization be characterized? The idea was to construct sovereign political subjectivity by erecting a symbolic boundary between the "people" and "the rulers," not between "us" and "them" conceived as an alien or undesired social group. 30 The striking workers and their supporters were delineating a public space within which the Polish people could freely constitute themselves using the available cultural idioms. a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.
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The way the central concept of populism, "the people," is defined is crucial. Populists posit that they hail from the people, understand them, and are their only rightful representatives. But for populists "the people," as Müller aptly puts it, "is a fictional entity outside existing democratic procedures, a homogeneous and morally unified body whose alleged will can be played off against actual election results in democracies." 34 It is, therefore, important to examine the specific constructions of the people that figure in particular populist imaginaries. For, as every skillful political entrepreneur understands, such discursive constructions, to be politically effective, need to reflect, or resonate with, the culture of the people to whom populists appeal. This seems to be one of the reasons, arguably the main one, why populist ideology needs to be "thickened," as its rudimentary, thin version cannot be resonant enough in a specific cultural context. thickening of populism to intensify a specific understanding of Polishness and enhance the popularity and influence of right-wing populism. In this task we are aided by the concept of discursive opportunity structure.
In an essay on what she calls Polish national sensorium, Zubrzycki argues that "…national mythologies are compelling insofar as the myths that comprise them are complementary, reinforcing, or overlapping at a given time." 50 There are, however, distinguishable levels or intensities of complementarity, reinforcing and overlapping in myths or symbolic systems. Let us examine three situations in order to develop the concept of symbolic thickening of public culture and its role in the construction of the image of national community.
Such a community can be signified by a single symbol that will tend to have a narrow intension (few attributes) 51 and thus broad extension (it is applicable to many referents). As such it can appeal to or attract a relatively large and varied set of people, as it potentially denotes many conceptions of a given community. For example, a national flag suggests "nation-ness" as a single, relatively uncomplicated attribute and therefore references many different "nations" understood as differently imagined communities. Both a moderate patriot and a chauvinist "see"
their respective "nations" in such an austere and thus (potentially) multi-vocal, polysemic or multi-referential symbol. 52 In other words, the flag, standing alone, is to a large degree a floating signifier, 53 as it may be "filled with content" in many different, even contradictory, ways.
When it comes to symbolic performances, however, it is rarely the case that they display a single symbol; they usually employ a few symbols that can be interpreted as a system. The semantic relation or cross-referencing (Zubrzycki's complementarity, reinforcing and overlapping) between its elements may range from tight and intense to virtually non-existent. The 50 G. Zubrzycki, "History and the National Sensorium: Making Sense of Polish Mythology,"
Qualitative Sociology 34 (2011): 21-57. 51 Intension (connotation) of the sign or symbol is defined here as a set of attributes ascribed to the objects that are referents of this sign. The set of the referents is the sign's extension (denotation). 52 Influenced by Turner, we see national flags, particularly when displayed during ritual performances as both referential and condensation symbols. The formers' dominant function is to communicate cognitive content, while the latter arouse or release both conscious and unconscious emotions. A national flag is a dominant symbol in a symbolic system designed to signify "the nation." As such they are multivocal and polysemic. See, for example, Turner, The Ritual Process. 53 A floating (or empty) signifier does not have a single, clear signified element associated with it.
It can easily be associated with various referents or ideas, often as a result of struggles for cultural/discursive hegemony.
degree of tightness/intensity of this relation can be identified by reconstructing the way in which the symbols are assembled within a system. If it is constructed by its creators and subsequently construed by the audience as rather loosely assembled, in a mechanism that resembles the logical operation OR, each symbol can be seen as relatively separate and therefore attract or resonate with a different discursive community. Thus the symbolic system based on this logic -let's call it "thin" -can be seen as "our own" by several, culturally dissimilar, groups of people.
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If, however, the mechanism by which the symbols are connected appears to be of the AND type, it is difficult to interpret each symbol separately. Rather, they appear to constitute a single whole and thus appeal mostly, if not exclusively, to a discursive community that is "ready"
to embrace the wholesale vision that it represents. Here we deal with a "thick" symbolic system that contains several symbols tightly cross-referenced via an AND-mechanism. Such a system's intension is rich, expansive (it has several mutually reinforcing attributes) and thus, per force, its extension is narrow (it has a smaller set of referenced "objects"). For example, "nation-ness" imagined in a symbolically thick manner, with several connected attributes, references a highly specific understanding of the "nation." In other words, such a symbolic system tends to become mono-vocal, since its referent is narrower, as in a singular version of nation-ness that is recognizable or appealing usually to a relatively small set of people. As a consequence, the people who are left out reimagine themselves by means of different symbolic systems, for example alternatively construed "nations." As a result, thick symbolic systems enhance cultural, thus also social, fragmentation or polarization.
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"Thick" symbolic systems tend to attract fewer people than "thin" ones. There are, however, situations when larger numbers of people accept, in a manner that is either genuine or simulated, having their collective identity defined in terms of a thick symbolic system, signifying a "narrow" conception of the nation. This is particularly pronounced during revolutionary upheavals or in authoritarian (and particularly totalitarian) countries, such as Nazi Germany or 54 To use terms borrowed from Laclau, in this situation a broad, inclusive form of collective identity can be hinted at, as what he calls the differential mode of constituting identity (that locks people in narrow sub-cultures) may be complemented but not overridden by the equivalential mode that emphasizes commonality. The constitutive units retain many if not most of their different attributes (in the minds of the participants) and this difference is seen as more central, important than the commonality that is merely hinted at. See E. Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005). 55 To use the Laclaulian language again, in a discursive community constituted by a thick symbolic system the sense of equivalence is far more dominant than the sense of difference.
Stalin's Soviet Union, that institute tight censorship, practice intimidation, and as a result eliminate or limit the possibility of articulating and displaying publicly competing visions of the nation.
The symbolic system of Solidarity, a powerful tool of polarization, 56 contained several symbols that -we contend -referenced each other rather loosely; it was a thin symbolic system.
Crucially, the famous Solidarity logo, by far the most dominant visual emblem of the movement, represented and reinforced the very idea of solidarity uniting people of different backgrounds and political convictions. 57 Similarly, the Christian Cross, often used in the movement's ceremonies, did not seem to have been interpreted by the audience as a single, exclusionary symbol of PolishCatholic identity. "Liberal" Catholics, "national" Catholics, devout believers and secular champions of national independence could "see" their imagined communities embraced in a broadly conceived image of the "people," represented by several, loosely connected, symbols, dominated by the Solidarity logo. 58 Moreover, the key symbols of the movement were not referencing "people" as defined in contradistinction to other "people," but to "the authorities." In essence, while the discourse of Solidarity was polarizing, most of the time it refrained from defining the "other" in ethnic or religious terms; the enemy was "the communists" and their system.
The symbolism of "The Rosary to the Borders" was "thicker," as the Rosary as a marker of magico-religious power simultaneously became a visual device that outlined the state borders and marked an exclusionary conception of national identity; the image suggested that they were inseparably intertwined. The essence of the associated performance was a prayer that is believed to have causal power to change reality; it is not merely an act of signifying collective identity.
The praying "Polish people" (not simply Catholics) are the collective agency endowed with that 56 Kubik, The Power, 266. 57 "Solidarity became such a formidable opponent of communism because it managed to mobilize millions of people through producing strong emotional attachment to a set of 'a-political' symbols and discourses. They were a-political in the sense that they stood for neither 'left' nor 'right;' neither centralization nor decentralization; neither authoritarian leadership nor participatory democracy. But they allowed the huge masses of people to win back their self-respect and dignity." (J. Kubik, "Who Done It? Workers or Intellectuals. A Controversy over Solidarity's Origins and Social Composition," Theory and Society 23 (1994): 460). 58 The "Solidarity" logo was the dominant summarizing symbol of the movement. It is also an example of a symbol that is simultaneously discursive and presentational. For a brief discussion of these concepts see Aronoff and Kubik, Anthropology, 70.
power. Moreover, the performance suggested to its audience a much more specific understanding of the relationship between Catholicism and national identity. Its dominant symbol, the borders of Poland delineated with the Rosary, set Poles apart from other nations and religious others, not from "the authorities," as was the case with the symbolism of Solidarity.
The difference between thin and thick symbolic systems has political consequences.
While the former are associated with a more inclusive, open visions of collective identity, the latter serve to define narrower visions. A transformation of a thin system of symbols pertaining to a specific referent (for example, the "nation") into a thick one -that we call symbolic thickening -portends therefore a momentous political change. Inspired by Mudde's distinction between thin and thick populism, in the rest of the essay we investigate the interaction between symbolic thickening of public culture and the ideological thickening of populism and argue that it is neither direct, nor unidirectional -contrary to the analysts of the supply side of populism and its influence on the symbolic sphere. Populist ideologies do have an impact on public culture, as they claim, but it is also the case that symbolic thickening creates conditions conducive to the ideological thickening of populism, particularly when it happens simultaneously at several levels of cultural production. To capture the nature of this process we employ the concept of discursive opportunity structure.
Koopmans and Stratham introduced the concept of discursive opportunity structure to the literature on social movements and protest politics in 1999, as a conceptual expansion of the concept of political opportunity structure. Guided by this concept researchers are supposed to study political-cultural or symbolic external constraints and facilitators of social movement mobilization. We propose to denote this set of variables by the term discursive opportunity structure, which may be seen as determining which ideas are considered "sensible," which constructions of reality are seen as "realistic," and which claims are held as "legitimate" within a certain polity at a specific time. 59 We look for such "constructions of reality" among the visual symbols and symbolic performances that thicken public culture and thus create discursive opportunities for populist 59 
Poznań June 1956 Monument
In June 1956, around 100,000 people took to the streets of Poznań in the first major protest against the communist rule in Poland. 61 The protest began as a spontaneous strike in the massive Joseph Stalin Metal Works, broadly known as "Cegielski." The workers walked out, others joined them along the way, and the protest culminated in a huge rally at Adam Mickiewicz Square. During the violent clashes with the police and the army, 57 people were killed and 60 Not all populists benefit from this phenomenon -some actors due to their ideological heterogeneity (Kukiz'15) or ambiguity (Self-defense) may owe their popularity and electoral support to their novelty and/or ability to appeal to voters disenchanted with mainstream parties. In this article we focus only on the discursive opportunity structure created for those populist movements whose ideologies are "thickened" with religious themes and who interact with symbolically thickened ethno-religious subcultures. On the complex ideologies of other populist movements see for example B. of the Poznań monument: "It is telling that the Poznań's double Cross, which commemorates the June tragedy, is also evidence of the power with which the human spirit, the Polish spirit, constantly desires to draw from the Cross of Christ. This Cross, it is worth recalling, stands in the place of the monument of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, erected in Poznań as a votive offering for the independence regained in 1918, which during the occupation was destroyed by the Germans." (Cieliczko, "Pomnik ofiar"). 70 During the 2006 refurbishment, a plaque commemorating the papal mass from 1997 was added to the site (the square). While not a direct intervention into the materiality of the monument, this act strengthens the religious denotation of the monument. This act of reinscription of the monument's intended message has triggered a controversy, at least among some historians and journalists who have claimed that during the actual revolt "the slogans related to religious freedom did not appear, and the Church's representatives did not engage in this workers' rebellion." 71 While the initial demands were predominantly economicas most historians seem to agree -and included "bread, lower prices, lower norms of work, and higher wages," political demands were quickly added. Szczesiak-Ślusarek reviews the protest slogans and concludes: "The importance of the motif of a demand for freedom increased with every hour of the protests. The effect of adding a new symbolic element, a two-word phrase (For God), is the change of overall meaning of the monument and its symbolic thickening. The new inscription signals unequivocally that the people who were demanding "Freedom, Law and Bread" need to be construed also as Christians and that in the Polish context by cultural default means Catholics.
The protestors' demands, therefore, cannot be seen as exclusively economic and political but also as religious (thus cultural), as -it is now emphasized -the revolt's participants demanded the recognition of their Catholic identity. Importantly, the fallen can now be seen also as martyrs sacrificing their lives for the faith. Moreover, this semantic shift was not accomplished by a mere administrative fiat, but by the means of a religious ritual: a procession organized as the Way of the Cross, led by Bishop Marek Jędraszewski, then of Poznań. 77 Polish public culture that frames political contests acquired one more signifier indicating that for many, the terms of this contest are religious.
Polish Independence Day: 11 November
In November 1918, after 123 years of political non-existence and the devastating World War I, Poland regained independence. Among several conflicts shaping the political life of the new republic, the polarizing antagonism between the supporters of Józef Piłsudski on the one hand, and Roman Dmowski on the other, was dominant. 78 Piłsudski embodied the Romantic 77 According to the official website launched for the 50 th anniversary of the events, the changes in the monument's inscription were motivated by the necessity to give justice to the workers religious demands: "The monument in Mickiewicz Square and its surroundings were renovated. Because the documents of the Institute of National Remembrance show that the demonstrating Poznań residents were singing 'God save Poland,' carried placards with slogans such as 'We want God,' and demanded the return of religion to schools, the phrase 'For God' has been added to the monument's existing inscription 'For freedom, law and bread.' In 1981, when the monument was unveiled, it was not possible to place an appeal to God yet." ("Inauguracja obchodów czerwca -wydarzenia przed 28 czerwca 2006 r.," n.d., http://www.poznan.pl/mim/czerwiec56/inauguracja-obchodow-czerwca-wydarzenia-przed-28-czerwca2006r,p,3043,6076,6080.html (accessed 18 November 2017)). In 2011 a group of anarchists proposed the further reinterpretation of the monument's meaning by changing the phrase "O Boga" into "O Bogatych" (in translation, "For God" into "For the rich"). See, Ł. Jastrząb, "Wokół obchodów," 5. July, to commemorate the creation of a Soviet-imposed communist Polish government in 1944.
But although the celebrations of 11 November were officially banned, some oppositional circles still gathered on that day and with time even the communist authorities started reviving some elements of the holiday, mostly related to the Piłsudski cult. 82 In the 1970s, the Party kept associating the meaning of 11 November with a mythology built around the paradigm of "socialist patriotism" and "progressive" historical turn initiated by the Bolshevik Revolution.
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By the end of the 1970s, dissidents representing several political camps were challenging the communist monopoly of power, not only by means of bottom-up mobilization and underground publishing but also by breaking the communist hold on public space. The anniversary of 1918 became a regular feature in the unofficial ceremonial calendar in the form of Catholic Masses, illegal marches, and rallies. 84 The path breaking and -given the communist ban -spectacular celebrations organized by several dissident groups in 1978 are a case in point. 85 The main organizers came from the "right" side of the dissident milieu, the most prominent being ROPCiO In the following years, National Independence Day became the most important state holiday. 92 The festivities were multifaceted, with solemn and carnivalesque tones intermixed.
Solemnity came from the dominance of the official, state-centered celebrations (Fig. 6) meaning-creators work together to invoke a specific albeit totalizing mythology of the national past to gain control over the present, also its political aspect. It is a cultural strategy in which, in
Appadurai words:
The past is now not a land to return in a simple politics of memory. It has become a synchronic warehouse of cultural scenarios, a kind of temporal central casting, to which recourse can be had as appropriate, depending on the movie to be made, the scene to be enacted, the hostages to be rescued.
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The evolution of the celebrations of 11 November is an example of symbolic thickening, as the propagated image of Polishness (the chief defining attribute of "the people"), initially "thin" for signified via a heterogeneous set of solemn and festive events, was gradually narrowed.
This happened as one specific vision of national identity -the intensely nationalistic Pole- 
Conclusions
In Negara, a masterful essay on the cultural dimension of statecraft, Geertz examines the refer to as the ideological thickening of populism. 120 The emergent ideological and cultural climate improved opportunities for enhancing the legitimacy of populist movements and parties. 121 The rising legitimacy and popularity of the increasingly vigorous right-leaning "thick" populism, in turn, contributed to the further symbolic thickening of public culture.
There are many instances of the intensifying religious thickening of Polish public culture, but the "Rosary to the Borders" is one of the most spectacular. This massive ritual helped to reinforce a specific understanding of Polishness, as the key attribute of "the people" who defend their specific collective identity (deeply nationalistic and ardently Catholic), but are also ready to go on a mission to re-Christianize Europe, armed with their rosaries. This understanding underpins the political program espoused by the ruling party, PiS, whose strongly populist ideology serves to legitimize their attacks on the institutions of the liberal-democratic order. In addition to expanding the discursive opportunity structure for the more "traditionalistic" and right-wing political actors, "Rosary" and similar rituals normalize the magical mode of engagement with the world, raising doubts about pragmatic, task-oriented politics.
To illustrate the mechanism of symbolic thickening we chose to study the change of meaning of the Poznań Monument. While the case is as simple as it can get (two words added to the inscription), it illustrates well the religionization of public culture and the resulting expansion of the discursive opportunity structure, for those political actors who want to promote religious ideas or have strong religious elements in their ideologies. Płócieniczak, "Mobilizing on the Extreme Right," and J. Kajta, "Discursive Strategies." She writes: "Both discursive and political opportunities now seem to be favorable for nationalist mobilization. Firstly, we observe a more general radicalization of the public discourse, including the spread of hate speech" (90). system in which symbolically thickened public culture, deeply resonant with at least some strands of Polish Catholicism, continues to provide a discursive opportunity structure that is skillfully used by various populist actors, including the ruling party, Law and Justice, to incite political polarization. As of the moment of this writing (November 2018), the support for PiS has not only not diminished, but arguably increased since its electoral victory of October 2015. This success cannot be fully explained by the party's populist economic program; the cultural-political feedback loop analyzed in this essay provides a critical part of the explanation.
